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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST LAW - PRICE DISCRIMINATION - DEFENSE OF
"MEETING COMPETITION" UNDER ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT. -
Gilbert McLean was one of thirty-eight Sun Oil Company retail
dealers in Jacksonville, Florida. His filling station was located
across the street from a station operated by the Super Test Oil
Company, a vertically integrated competitor of the Sun Oil Com-
pany. In August 1955, the Super Test station began a series
of price cuts which substantially reduced McLean's sales. After
extensive study of the situation, Sun gave in to McLean's pleas
and granted him a discount of 1.7 cents a gallon. Despite this
aid, McLean was forced to go out of business less than two
months later. In September 1956, the Federal Trade Commission
filed a complaint charging Sun with a price discrimination violation
of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Sun asserted that
its allowance to McLean was a good faith price reduction to
meet competition, as provided for by section 2(b) of the act.
The Commission adopted the findings 1 and conclusions of the
hearing examiner and issued a cease 'and desist order against
Sun. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the
Commission's order and held, inter alia, that the defense of meeting
competition in good faith is available to a supplier of gasoline
when the supplier reduces the price of its gasoline to one of its
filling stations engaged in a price battle at the consumer level with a
station owned and operated by a competing supplier. Sun Oil Co.
v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) 1 700 83 (5th Cir.
July 24, 1961).
The prime issue in the Sun Oil case revolved around the
Robinson-Patman Act, 2 which was enacted in 1936 with the general
purpose of preventing discriminations in price and other business
practices injuriously affecting free competitive enterprise.3  The
act contains four sections, 4 but of importance here is section 1
1 The examiner also found that Sun and McLean entered into a price fixing
agreement which both destroyed the good faith defense and violated Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
249 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 13 (1958).
3 AUSTIN, PRICE: DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 1 (2d rev. ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as AUSTIN].
4 Section 1 is discussed in the text; section 2 contains saving provisions
as to the effect of the amendments made by section 1 on pending litigation
and on Commission orders previously issued under Section 2 of the Clayton
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which contains the federal law of price discrimination as ad-
ministered and enforced in civil proceedings by the Federal Trade
Commission and the courts.5  Section 1 amended Section 2 of
the Clayton Act by enlarging it into six subdivisions: 2(a) to 2(f) .
The problems of the Sun Oil case can be illuminated by focusing
on two of these subdivisions, viv., 2(a) and particularly, 2(b).
Section 2(a) is the basic section, prohibiting direct and indirect
discrimination in price having any of the specified adverse effects
on competition; section 2(b) permits a seller to defend against price
discrimination charges by showing that his lower, discriminatory 7
price was made in good faith to meet the equally low price of a
competitor.8
The good faith defense of 2(b) was formerly considered
procedural.9 The Commission took the position that a successful
defense of meeting competition under 2(b) merely rebutted a
prima facie violation under 2(a) and called for proof of actual,
not merely potential, competitive injury. °  However, in Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC," the Supreme Court rejected this view and held
that the meeting competition proviso of 2(b) affords an absolute
defense to a charge of a violation of 2(a), even where incidental
injury might occur. The Court, however, did seem to add one
qualification: the competitor's price met had to be a "lawful" one.
12
The Standard Oil decision brought outcries from those who feared 13
Act; section 3 (Borah-Van Nuys Bill) is a criminal section, imposing
penalties of fine or imprisonment for violation; section 4 contains an ex-
emption relating to co-operative associations. See AusTN 1-4.
5 AusrN 1.
6 Ibid.
7 See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), where the
Supreme Court decided that any difference in price is a "discrimination in
price."8 AusTN 1-2.
9 AusrTn 2; Haslett, Price Discriminations and their Justifications Under
the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 46 MicH. L. Rxv. 450, 476-77 (1948).
For the legislative history of the "meeting competition" proviso, see AUSTIN
93-95.
10 Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look
at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 965-66 (1951); Haslett, supra
note 9.
11340 U.S. 231 (1951).
21bid. This qualification, not found in the statute itself, raised new
uncertainties, among them whether the seller had the burden of proving
that the price met was not unlawful. See AusTi 2 n.2; Moorhead, Meeting
"An Equally Low Price of a Competitor": A Plea For Judicial Clarification
of a Judicial Construction, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 439 (1960). Two circuit
courts have answered this question in the negative. Balian Ice Cream Co.
v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
991, petition for rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 928 (1956) ; Standard Oil Co. v.
Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1956).
13It would appear that the fears were somewhat unfounded. In 1955
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that approval of the Court's view would reduce the price dis-
crimination law "to an empty and useless shell." 1' They took
issue with groups who felt that the Standard Oil holding was
"consonant with the Nation's antitrust policy." 15 However, despite
the controversy and despite attempts to alter its legal effect,'
6
section 2(b) retains its character as an absolute defense.
Through the years, the Robinson-Patman Act has been criticized
for its inept draftsmanship and ambiguities.17  The problems caused
by unclear wording and meaning are not absent from the section
2(b) defense.' s First, the Commission must establish its prima
facie case consisting of sufficient proof, absent any rebutting evi-
dence, of a price discrimination violative of section 2(a). 9 . Not
every price discrimination is a violation. Therefore, the following
matters must be proved: (1) jurisdiction, (2) commerce, (3)
discrimination in price, (4) use, consumption or resale in the
United States or any Territory, (5) injury to competition.2 0  The
difficulty arises when we try to interpret the portion of the statute
which permits the seller to rebut this prima facie case by showing
that his lower price was made in "good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor."
At the outset it must be kept in mind that the Commission
has always given the narrowest and most restricted interpretation
to the defenses provided by the statute.2 ' Many of the restrictions
have formulated themselves around the element of "good faith"
meeting of competition and have been used to deny the defense.22
the Attorney General's Committee appointed to study the antitrust laws
reported that up to that date not a single seller in a recorded case had
succeeded in finally justifying a challenged discrimination by recourse to the
section 2(b) defense of "meeting competition." ATr'Y. GEN. NAT'L CoMM.
ANTiTRusT REP. 181 (1955). See also EDWARDS, THE PRIcE DIscmMNATioN
LAW 578 (1959).
24Price Discrimination, The Robinson-Patinan Act, and the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, H.R. REP. No.
2966, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1956).
'
5 ATr'Y. GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 181 (1955). However,
this view was not shared by all the members of the Attorney General's
Committee. Id. at 185-86.
16 See EDwARDS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 569-80.
"7 See AUSTIn 5. The Act was primarily aimed at chain stores, but
the universal expressions contained in the statute caused decisions affecting all
sectors of industry. See Rowe, supra note 10, at 929, 942. See also Sun Oil
Co. v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) 170083, at 78345 n28
(5th Cir. July 24, 1961).Is See Haslett, supra note 9, at 473.
19 AusTn 85.
20 See AusTnN 86-89. In the area of injury to competition a prima fade
case may involve gradations of proof. Id. at 89-92.
21 See Barton, Defenses in Price Discrimination Cases, 17 A.B.A. ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, 389 (1960).
22 Id. at 391. The author notes that the Commission has made use of
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Hence, in FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.,23 where it was found
that the price discriminations were part of a general pricing system
and not adopted in response to an individual competitive situation,
good faith was precluded and the defense denied. In the Staley
case the respondent sought to justify its pricing system on the
basis of one employed by the Corn Products Manufacturing
Company 24 which had been determined to be a violation of section
2(a). The Court emphasized that the defense was not available
to one who was merely adopting a competitor's unlawful practice.
25
Thus, as later indicated in the Standard Oil case, the "lawfulness" 26
of a competitor's prices can enter into the good faith of a re-
spondent who meets them.2 7  The wording of the statute itself,
which permits a seller in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor, has provided the Commission with another lim-
itation. Thus the seller, to prove his good faith, must show
that his purpose was defensive rather than aggressive. 29  In Enter-
prise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co. 29 the Commission advanced still
another restriction which helped to defeat the seller's good faith
defense: the competitor had to offer his low price to the seller's
customer before the seller could lower his price."s The district
court in the Enterprise case emphasized that the act did not permit
these restrictions especially where, as in the Sun Oil case, the injury was
alleged and found in the secondary line, i.e., between customers of the
seller.
23324 U.S. 746 (1945).
24 See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) which decision
was handed down the same day as the Staley case.
22324 U.S. 746 (1945). The Court stated that it was the clear intent
of Congress "not to sanction by 2(b) the excuse that the person charged
with a violation of the law was merely adopting a similarly unlawful
practice of another." Id. at 754.
26 The Attorney General's Report felt that by "lawful" the Court merely
wished to exclude prices established pursuant to a conspiracy or an illegal
basing-point system, or otherwise unrelated to potential differences in rival
seller's cost. ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L Commn. ANTITRUST REP. 182 (1955). See
also Barton, supra note 21, at 394.2 7AT-'y. Ga. NAT'I Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 182 (1955); EDWARDS,
TnE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 562-63 (1959).
28See EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 27, at 552; Sun Oil Co. v. FTC,
TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) IT 70083, at 78350 n.43 (5th Cir. July
24, 1961). For a criticism of this restriction, see Barton, supra note 21, at
394-95. See also Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion:
Another Look At Robinson-Patman, 60 YAI.E L.J. 929, 970 (1951).
29 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).301d. at 421. See also Barton, supra note 21, at 391. The Enterprise
view is attacked in Note, The Good Faith Defense of the Robinson-Patman
Act: A New Restriction Appraised, 66 YALE L.J. 935 (1957), where the
author regards it as "not only ill-designed to remedy the evils of the gasoline
industry, but actually opposed to the policies of the Robinson-Patman Act
and other antitrust legislation." Id. at 938.
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price discrimination "to enable a buyer to meet price competition,
but only to enable the seller to meet . . . the seller's competitor." 31
Relying on the Enterprise case, the Commission took the same
stand in the principal case: it contended that Sun should be
denied the 2(b) defense as Super Test had not offered any price
to McLean.3 2  The Fifth Circuit Court refused to follow the
Enterprise case, permitted the defense, and set aside the cease
and desist order. The Court pointed out that the nature of the
gasoline industry made the Commission's approach unrealistic.
The retailer's business is built around pumps which can be used for
only one brand of gasoline-that of his supplier.3 3  Therefore it
was a "fiction" 34 to speak of competition at the oil company sale
to the station level. The record showed that Sun's action was
not intended to allow a buyer to meet competition. Sun reduced
its prices to McLean to help itself; to meet lower prices that were
inducing customers into buying Super Test instead of Sunoco.3
The Court felt that the Commission was overlooking the factor
that Super Test was vertically integrated and that the effect of
its view would be to force Sun to combine direct retailing
with its other operation,3 6 thereby injuring McLean and Super
Test 37 as well. Recalling the Standard Oil case, the Court stated
the core of the defense to be that a seller could lower his price
whenever a competitor's lawful price "threatens to deprive a seller
31 Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420, 421 (D. Conn.
1955). Thus, in the instant case, the FTC adopted the Enterprise theory and
argued that the defense would be available to the seller only to enable him
to meet direct competition for the business of his customer.
32 Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, supra- note 28, at 78341-42. It is interesting
to note that in the Standard Oil case, the respondent, in attempting to
show its good faith, introduced evidence of competitive offers received by
the four jobbers (who were permitted the discriminatory prices) from
distributors of both major and minor brands of gasoline. The Commission
argued that this made no difference where actual competitive injury was
shown. Matter of Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 281 (1945).
33 Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, supra note 28, at 78346. The Vice-President
of the Sun Oil Co. testified as to the rarity and inadvisability of "split pump
stations," i. e., stations handling more than one brand. Id. at 78343 n.19.
34 Id. at 78346. Note the language of the district court in the Enterprise
case: "In view of the short term station and equipment leases in effect
with some stations, perhaps it is a fiction to speak of price competition at
the oil company sale to the station level. That is the competitive level at
which the justification is provided . . . in the Act, however." Enterprise
Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420, 421 (D.Conn. 1955). (Emphasis
added.)
35 Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, supra note 28, at 78347.
36 Id. at 78347. Compare Note, supra note 30, at 943.
37 Super Test Oil Co., though vertically integrated, was considered a non-
major (independent) competitor of Sun's. Therefore, any further integration
by a major company such as Sun would be detrimental to Super Test.
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of a customer ... ." "8 Thus Sun, to retain its customer, McLean,
was entitled to the defense.
The Court is careful to note the particular circumstances of
this case, viz., the make-up of the gasoline industry in general
and the vertical integration 3 9 of Super Test in particular, but
it seems that the well-reasoned opinion has provided at least two
basic rules of construction concerning the applicability of section
2(b), which go beyond the bare facts of the decision. First,
courts are not to adhere to a strict, literal interpretation of the
wording contained in the defense. Instead, they are to look to
the individual competitive situations and be bound rather by
the spirit of the law and the overall national policy which fosters
the competitive process. Secondly, the tribunals must be careful
to keep in mind the economic realities of the market place: to
realize, for example, that sellers of competing products may be
very much in competition with each other even though they do not
sell to the same retailers.
While the Court's dismissal of the Enterprise restriction clearly
seems warranted in the Sun Oil case, the conclusion of the Fifth
Circuit cannot be applied arbitrarily to any competitive situation so
as to permit every seller to go to the aid of a struggling customer.
The Robinson-Patman Act still forbids unwarranted favoritism
among customers, and despite its numerous shortcomings, it re-
mains the law. The present case, however, is perhaps an indication
that a more realistic application of its sections will be forthcoming.
)X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EVIDENCE-EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
BY STATE OFFICERS HELD INADMISSIBLE IN STATE CoURT.-On
May 23, 1957 Cleveland police officers sought admittance to the
Mapp home in search of a suspected criminal and "policy para-
phernalia" believed hidden there. Miss Mapp refused them en-
trance without a warrant. Some hours later the police returned
and forced their way into the Mapp home. When asked for a
warrant they produced a piece of paper which Miss Mapp never
had an opportunity to examine. She was then handcuffed and
the house searched. During this search the police uncovered
certain obscene material, for possession of which the appellant was
38Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242 (1951).
39Super Tests integration resulted in a competitive situation wherein a
supplier-retailer was pitted against a supplier.
1961 ]
